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The effect of takeovers on the fundamental
value of acquirers
Paul M. Guest, Magnus Bild, and Mikael Runsten*
Abstract – This paper develops a new methodology to examine the financial impact of acquisitions, designed to address
whether takeovers yield a positive net present value for the acquiring company. Specifically, we employ the residual income
valuation method to compare the fundamental value of the acquiring company before acquisition with the fundamental value
after acquisition. We apply this methodology to 303 UK acquisitions completed during 1985–1996, and compare the results
with the effects of takeover on profitability and short- and long-run share returns. We find that the impact of acquisition on
fundamental value is slightly negative but statistically insignificant. This result differs from the effect of takeover on
profitability, which is significantly positive, and the effect of takeover on share returns, which is significantly negative.
Keywords: acquisitions; fundamental value; residual income; profitability; share returns
1. Introduction
From the perspective of acquiring firms, a question
of paramount importance is whether the present
value of the financial benefits from an acquisition is
greater than the present value of the costs. In other
words, is the acquisition a positive net present value
investment? If it is, then the fundamental value of
the acquiring firm should increase following acqui-
sition, hence creating value for acquirer sharehold-
ers. According to financial theory, this is a key
criterion that acquirers should apply and, appar-
ently, a method that many finance executives of
acquiring companies do apply (Graham and
Harvey, 2001).
There is a vast research literature on the financial
effects of takeover, which has primarily employed
two distinct methodologies. Profitability studies
compare the post-acquisition performance of the
acquiring firm with the pre-acquisition performance
of the acquiring and acquired firm. Share return
event studies examine the share price impact of the
acquisition on the acquired and acquiring firms. In
addressing the specific question of whether the
acquisition is a positive net present value invest-
ment and increases the fundamental value of the
acquirer, both methods have drawbacks.
Profitability studies are not designed to address
this question and hence do not account for crucial
aspects such as the timing of profits earned, or the
amount paid for the target company. Share return
studies examine the impact of an acquisition on the
acquirer’s share price at announcement, but the
impact on share price may be very different from the
impact on fundamental value. For example, an
acquisition may be a positive net present value
investment but not to the extent that the market
expected, and hence share price may fall despite the
acquirer’s fundamental value increasing.
In this paper we develop an alternative method-
ology to address the impact of acquisitions on the
fundamental value of acquirers, and test it on a
sample of acquiring firms. Our approach is based on
the residual income approach to fundamental valu-
ation. In recent years accounting research has re-
explored fundamental approaches to corporate
valuation and models based on residual income
have attained a widespread use (e.g. Lee, 1999). We
use the residual income approach to estimate the
fundamental value of acquirers before acquisition
and compare this valuation with their fundamental
value following the acquisition. If takeovers create
fundamental value for acquiring firms, then the
latter should be greater than the former. Our
approach provides an alternative methodology that
avoids some of the weaknesses of profit and share
return studies in addressing this specific issue.
However, it is important to note that it shares some
weaknesses and has its own separate weaknesses,
which we discuss below.
We apply the residual income methodology to a
sample of 303 domestic UK acquisitions involving
public companies. We compare the results of this
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approach with the effects of takeover on profitabil-
ity and short-and long-run share returns. We find
that the impact of acquisition on fundamental value
is insignificantly negative. This result differs mark-
edly from the effect of takeover on profitability,
which is significantly positive, and the effect of
takeover on share returns, which is significantly
negative. Although acquirers improve their profit-
ability, this does not result in a significant increase
in fundamental value. The main contribution of this
study is to use an established valuation technique to
develop a new methodology for measuring the
performance of acquiring firms.
The paper is organised as follows: The next
section reviews the empirical literature on acquisi-
tion performance, and discusses why existing
methods may not adequately measure the impact
on fundamental value. Section 3 describes the
sample, Section 4 describes the methodology,
Section 5 reports the results from the empirical
analysis and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
In this section we consider what the existing
empirical literature on acquisitions tells us about
the effect of takeovers on fundamental value. In
Section 2.1 we examine profitability studies and in
Section 2.2 we consider the event study literature.
2.1. Profitability studies
The objective of profitability studies is to examine
whether an acquisition improves the profitability of
the combined assets of the acquirer and acquiree.
The approach examines the difference between the
post-acquisition performance of the acquirer (which
includes the acquiree post-acquisition) and the pre-
acquisition combined (weighted average) perform-
ance of the acquirer and acquiree. It then compares
this difference with a benchmark based on, for
example, control firms matched by industry and
size. The evidence for the UK appears to depend on
the sample period. For studies covering the 1960s
and 1970s, some studies (Meeks, 1977; Chatterjee
and Meeks, 1996) find little evidence of improved
profitability, whilst others (Cosh et al., 1980) find
evidence of significant improvements. However,
studies for the 1980s and 1990s consistently find
evidence of significant improvements in perform-
ance (Chatterjee and Meeks, 1996; Manson et al.,
1994; Manson et al., 2000; Powell and Stark, 2005
and Cosh et al., 2006).1
The methodology of profitability studies is not
designed to address how takeovers impact the
fundamental value of the acquirer, and thus it is
difficult to infer this particular impact. There are
several reasons for this.
First, in estimating the impact on fundamental
value, the appropriate comparison is the fundamen-
tal value of the acquirer with the acquisition
compared with the fundamental value of the
acquirer without the acquisition. Profitability stud-
ies compare the acquirer’s post-acquisition per-
formance with the pre-acquisition weighted average
performance of the acquirer and acquired com-
panies. However, the pre-acquisition weighted
average measure is not an appropriate benchmark
for the acquirer’s performance in the absence of the
acquisition.
Second, the change in the acquirer’s profits
following an acquisition needs to be considered in
relation to the acquirer’s cost of capital. For
fundamental value to be created, any marginal
profit return must be greater than the marginal cost
of capital. For example, the profitability of the
acquirer could be lower following acquisition, but if
the marginal profitability is higher than the marginal
cost of capital, then the acquisition may create
fundamental value.
Third, profitability studies give equal weight to
each post-takeover year. However, the timing of
profits is important in establishing whether acqui-
sitions increase fundamental value, and future
profits should be discounted by an appropriate
cost of capital.
Finally, by explicitly excluding goodwill on
acquisition from the acquirer’s post-acquisition
balance sheet and employing a pre-amortisation
profit measure, profitability studies do not account
for the price paid for the target company. The reason
for this is that the objective of these studies is to
compare the pre-acquisition combined performance
with the post-acquisition combined performance,
and including purchased goodwill would induce a
downward bias to the profitability change.2
However, to examine the impact of takeover on
fundamental value, this goodwill, which represents
part of the cost of acquisition, must be taken into
account. Alberts and Varaiya (1989) argue that
given the large premiums that are typically paid, it is
unlikely that the average acquisition creates funda-
mental value for the acquirer.
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1 For reviews, see Hughes (1989), Tuch and O’Sullivan
(2007) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008).
2 A rare exception would be where the acquisition is paid for
from the acquirer’s cash reserves. In this case, removing
goodwill would result in the combined assets being lower
following acquisition, and therefore removal of goodwill will
cause a positive bias to the impact of takeover on profitability.
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2.2. Share return studies
The majority of takeover event studies or share
return studies examine share returns to the acquirer
and acquiree over a short-run period surrounding
the announcement. Since these studies measure
returns over very short time periods, compared to
profitability studies they have the advantage of
being less subject to problems of noise and
benchmark error. The results show significant
gains for target shareholders, zero to negative
returns for acquiring shareholders, and significant
gains overall.3 Two recent UK studies for the period
under consideration in this paper report signifi-
cantly negative abnormal returns to acquirers
(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003 and Conn et al.,
2005). The announcement returns have been inter-
preted as directly showing the impact on funda-
mental value of the acquisition, and hence showing
that acquisitions are a zero or negative net present
value investment for acquirers (see Bruner, 2002).
A number of event studies also examine share
returns over a long-run post-acquistion period and
find evidence of significant negative returns.4 These
include UK studies that overlap our sample time
period such as Gregory (1997), Sudarsanam and
Mahate (2003) and Conn et al. (2005). One
interpretation of long-run negative returns is that
they are evidence of initial market misvaluations of
takeover gains, which reverse over the long run.
However, the share price reaction of the acquirer
around the announcement and over the long run
may not reflect the impact on the acquirer’s
fundamental value. The problem is that the
announcement (and long-run) returns reveal infor-
mation not just about the potential synergies arising
from the combination and how the value is split
between the target and the bidder, but also the
bidder’s standalone value. It is seldom possible to
disentangle the impact on stock prices of these
effects and thereby evaluate whether the marginal
benefit of the acquisition to the acquirer is greater
than the cost.
One problem is anticipatory market prices. For
example, when an acquirer makes a positive net
present value acquisition, the market value of the
firm will be affected, depending on whether the net
present value meets expectations. If the market
expects a firm to make high positive net present
value acquisitions, market prices will build in this
expectation, and even if the new acquisition has a
positive net present value, share price may decline
if the acquisition does not meet market expect-
ations.5
Another problem is stock market mispricing.
Acquisitions (especially those made with equity)
may reveal to the market that acquirers are
overvalued, and part of the announcement (and
long-run) return may reflect a negative reaction to
perceived overvaluation rather than fundamental
value destruction (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Ang
and Cheng (2006) and Dong et al. (2006) provide
evidence consistent with this.6
In summary, because of market expectations and
stock market mispricing, event studies may not
measure the impact of acquisitions on the funda-
mental value of the acquirer. Similarly, it is difficult
to infer the impact of a takeover on fundamental
value from profitability studies, since they do not
measure the total discounted value effect of a
takeover. For these reasons, we adopt a residual
income valuation method as an alternative means of
assessing the impact of an acquisition on the
acquirer’s fundamental value.
3. The sample
We examine a comprehensive sample of acquisi-
tions of UK public companies by UK public
companies, completed between January 1985 and
December 1996. The acquisitions are drawn from
the Thomson Financial publication Acquisitions
Monthly. Takeovers are defined as occurring when
the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target’s
shares before the takeover, and increases its own-
ership to at least 50% as a result of the takeover. We
include takeovers for which Datastream holds both
bidder and target accounting data for a minimum
period of two years before and two years after the
takeover. This results in an initial sample of 358
acquisitions. We exclude acquisitions in which
either the acquirer, target or control firms have a
negative equity book value in any of the four years
before or following the acquisition, since our
performance measures are nonsensical for such
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/8/2010 02 ABR Guest.3d Page 335 of 352
3 For reviews, see Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) and
Martynova and Renneboog (2008).
4 For reviews, see Hughes (1989), Tuch and O’Sullivan
(2007) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008).
5 Jensen and Ruback (1983) report that returns tend to be
much larger for acquisition programme announcements than for
subsequent acquisition announcements, and argue that the
impact of an acquisition on fundamental value may have been
incorporated at the time of an acquisition programme announce-
ment.
6 Bhagat et al. (2005) point to other ‘revelation biases’ that
result in both accounting and event study returns providing a
biased estimate of the fundamental gains from takeovers. For
example, the fact of a bid may reveal prospects for future
accounting improvements that would have occurred even
without a takeover. Bhagat et al. (2005) and Hietala et al.
(2003) use an interventionist approach to avoid such effects, and
show that takeovers have a positive impact on acquirer returns.
However, such approaches can only be applied to specific
samples of acquisitions.
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firms. This procedure results in a sample of 303
acquisitions.
Table 1 reports transaction characteristics for the
303 acquisitions. By method of payment, we
classify 21.45% of the sample acquisitions as
‘Cash’, defined as either pure cash offers (13.53%)
or cash offers with a loan note alternative (7.92%).
The latter method was common during the sample
period and allowed target shareholders to defer
capital gains tax, but is, in economic reality, a cash
offer. We classify 57.1% of acquisitions as ‘Equity’,
defined as either pure equity offers (21.78%) or
equity offers with a cash alternative (35.31%).
12.87% of acquisitions involve a ‘Mixed’ offer,
defined as a combination of cash and equity. We
define the remaining 8.58% as ‘Other’.7
The average bid premium (measured as the final
offer price minus the price one month before
announcement) is 36.80%. The average relative
size of target to acquirer companies (in terms of
market value) at the time of the acquisition is
35.72%. A minority (34.98%) of sample acquisi-
tions involve two firms in the same Datastream
Industrial Classification level four, and are classi-
fied as horizontal.8 The majority (65%) of acquisi-
tions take place in the 1980s. The 303 acquisitions
are carried out by 205 acquiring firms, with 63
carrying out more than one sample acquisition.
4. Methodology
In this section we describe the methodology
employed in the study. To place the results using
our fundamental value approach in context, we also
estimate takeover performance using an accounting
rate of return measure and event study analysis.
Section 4.1 describes the former, Section 4.2 the
latter. Section 4.3 describes the fundamental valu-
ation approach.
4.1. Accounting rate of return methodology
For the accounting rate of return measure we
compare the post-takeover profitability of acquirers
with the pre-takeover weighted average profitability
of acquirers and targets, relative to non-merging
control firms. The weighted average performance of
the bidder and target firms is calculated over the
three years before the takeover (years 3 to 1) to
obtain the pre-takeover performance measure. We
compare this with the three-year post-takeover
performance (years 1 to 3) of the bidder to measure
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Table 1
Transaction descriptives for the acquisition sample
% of acquisitions by method of payment
Cash 21.45
Equity 57.10
Mixed 12.87
Other 8.58
Average bid premium (%) 36.80
Average relative size (%) 35.72
% of horizontal acquisitions 34.98
Notes
This table reports summary statistics for a sample of 303 acquisitions of UK public targets by UK public
firms between January 1985 and December 1996, where the acquirer and target are included on the
Datastream Database. Horizontal acquisitions are defined as those in which the acquirer and target share the
same primary Datastream Industrial Classification level four. ‘Cash’ offers include pure cash offers (13.53%)
and cash offers with a loan note alternative (7.92%). ‘Equity’ offers include pure equity offers (21.78%) and
equity offers with a cash alternative (35.31%). ‘Mixed’ includes offers that include a combination of cash
and equity. ‘Other’ includes the following payment methods: all cash or cash plus equity (2.97%), all equity
or cash plus equity (2.31%), convertible preference shares with a cash alternative (0.33%), equity or debt or
cash (0.99%), all cash or cash plus equity with a loan note alternative (0.66%), pure debt (0.33%), other
(0.99%). The bid premium is estimated as the difference between the transaction value and the market value
of the target one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Relative size is measured as the bid value
divided by the market value of the acquirer at announcement.
7 These include the following payment methods: all cash or
cash plus equity (2.97%), all equity or cash plus equity (2.31%),
convertible preference shares with a cash alternative (0.33%),
equity or debt or cash (0.99%), all cash or cash plus equity with
a loan note alternative (0.66%), pure debt (0.33%), and other
(0.99%).
8 This classification is based on 38 different industrial
classifications and is similar in detail to the two-digit UK
Standard Industrial Classification.
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the performance change caused by the merger. The
abnormal profit return is the difference between this
change for the combined firm and the change for the
weighted-average control firms. The weights for the
control firms are the relative equity book values of
bidders and targets in year 1. Consistent with
previous studies, we exclude year 0, the year of
consolidation, from the analysis. This is because
with acquisition accounting, the consolidated profit
and loss account of the acquirer in year 0 only
shows the proportion of the target’s profits earned
since the date of acquisition.9 If acquirers die within
the four post-takeover years, the year of death
becomes the final year of analysis.
As the specific measure of profitability, we use a
return on equity (ROE) measure, consisting of net
income, scaled by the opening period book value of
ordinary shareholders funds.10 We select this
measure because it is most closely linked to the
measure used in the residual income method
described in Section 4.3 below.
To benchmark the change in profitability, we use
non-merging control firms matched by industry and
size. Previous acquisition studies show that
acquirers tend to have above average size
(Hughes, 1989), while acquisitions tend to cluster
in specific industries that are undergoing funda-
mental shocks (for the US see Mitchell and
Mulherin, 1996 and Andrade and Stafford, 2004,
whilst for the UK see Powell and Yawson, 2005).
Previous performance studies show that both fac-
tors can determine future profitability (Barber and
Lyon, 1996). We select the control firms from all
firms listed on Datastream that neither made, nor
received, a takeover offer for a public company
during the three years before and after the acqui-
sition year and that have accounting data on
Datastream over this period. We first match each
sample firm to all non-merging firms in the same
Datastream Industrial Classification level four,
which is equivalent to Standard Industrial
Classification Level 2. Second, we select the firm
within this industrial code with book value of total
assets closest to the sample firm’s book value in the
year prior to takeover.11
To measure takeover performance, we use a
simple change model that compares pre- and post-
acquisition performance as follows:
Takeover performance ¼ ROEpost ROEpre ð1Þ
where ROEpost is the mean abnormal profit rate for
the three post-takeover years, ROEpre is the mean
abnormal profit rate for the three pre-takeover years,
and by abnormal, we mean the sample firm’s ROE
minus the control firm’s ROE.
A potential problem with the change model in
Equation (1) is that if acquirers have above average
pre-acquisition profitability, then profitability may
decline following takeover because of mean rever-
sion in profitability, regardless of any takeover
impact. The studies referred to above show
acquirers have above average pre-acquisition prof-
itability. Rather than match on this additional factor,
which would mean compromising on either the
industry match or the size match, we employ the
regression model employed by previous studies
(Manson et al., 2000), regressing the post-takeover
abnormal profit rate for each acquisition on an
equivalent pre-takeover abnormal profit rate as
follows:
ROEpost ¼ a þ bROEpre þ e ð2Þ
The coefficient β allows for mean reversion in
profitability and the intercept α gives an estimate of
the average improvement in performance. By
controlling for pre-takeover performance in this
way, the mean unexplained post-takeover perform-
ance (the intercept α) is attributable to the take-
over.12
As noted in Section 2.1 above, if goodwill arises
on acquisition and is capitalised on the acquirer’s
balance sheet, this may impose a downward bias on
the profitability measure compared to the pre-
takeover combined performance benchmark.
Hence, previous studies have removed goodwill
on acquisition from the acquirer’s post-acquisition
assets. Over our sample period, UK acquirers could
account for an acquisition using either ‘acquisition’
or ‘merger’ accounting. Acquisition accounting
involves consolidating the acquiree’s assets at fair
values, capitalising goodwill on the acquirer’s
balance sheet with amortisation. Merger accounting
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9 In separate tests, we include year 0 and therefore examine
four years of post-acquisition data. The results are very similar
and our conclusions unchanged.
10 In separate tests, we use an average of opening and closing
book equity as the denominator. The results using this
alternative method are very similar and our conclusions
unchanged.
11 The average (median) total asset size in the year prior to
takeover for sample firms and their controls are as follows:
acquirers, £1,346.1m (£194.1m); acquirer control firms,
£1,700.1m (£144.4m); target firms, £182.2m (£29.4m); target
control firms, £323.0m (£34.0m).
12 Although Equation (2) controls for pre-bid profitability, it
may produce biased results when acquirers differ from control
firms on unmatched permanent characteristics that determine
future profitability (Ghosh, 2001). In such cases, the intercept
picks up the effect of these factors on profitability and a simple
change model as in Equation (1) is more appropriate. However,
if the matching method does not control for a temporary (rather
than permanent) driver of profitability, then both models are
equally biased (Ghosh, 2001).
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involves adding the acquirer’s and acquiree’s assets
and liabilities together at book values without any
goodwill. From the start of our sample period to
1998, most UK acquirers used the acquisition
method but then immediately wrote off the pur-
chased goodwill as they were allowed to do
(Higson, 1998; Gregory, 2000).13 Capitalised good-
will (and hence any expected bias) is therefore
expected to be negligible for the acquirers in our
sample.14
For our 303 sample acquisitions, of the 182
sample acquisitions for which the Thomson
Financial SDC Database reports the accounting
method, in only one case does the acquirer use
merger accounting. The vast majority of our sample
acquirers also appear to write off goodwill imme-
diately against reserves. Of the 303 acquirers,
269 have zero goodwill and intangible assets on
their balance sheet at year 0, and a further four
report no change from year 1 to year 0. Thus, at
most 34 sample acquirers capitalise goodwill
following the acquisition, though the figure may
be less since the change could reflect other changes
such as incorporated target goodwill, or the pur-
chase or revaluation of other intangible assets. In
what follows, for robustness, we report results for
both the entire sample and for the reduced sample of
269 acquirers that do not capitalise goodwill on
acquisition. We consider the robustness of our
results in Section 5.1 below.
4.2. Event study methodology
We estimate abnormal share returns for both the
announcement month, and the 36-month post-
takeover period beginning the month following
completion. In measuring post-takeover returns, we
employ two measures, paying careful attention to
the potential problem of cross-sectional dependence
in returns. This is a potential problem for our sample
because acquisitions tend to cluster by both time
and industry (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996), caus-
ing standard errors to be biased downwards and
t–statistics to be biased upwards (Barber and Lyon,
1997; Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999; Mitchell and
Stafford, 2000).
First, we estimate buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHARs) and calculate t–statistics which are
adjusted for cross-sectional dependence using the
following approximation for the standard deviation
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000): σBHAR (independ-
ence) / σBHAR (dependence) ≈ 1 / √ 1 + (N –1) ρ i,j
where σ BHAR = standard deviation of individual
BHARs, N = number of sample acquisitions and
ρi,j = average correlation of individual BHARs. As
an estimate for ρi,j, we use the estimate of 0.002
calculated by Conn et al. (2005) for a larger sample
of acquisitions over our sample period.15
Second, we use the Jaffe (1974) - Mandelker
(1974) calendar time portfolio technique. In each
calendar month we form a portfolio of event firms,
and take the average cross-sectional abnormal
return for that month. The average abnormal return
for the entire sample is the time series average and
the t-test is calculated using the time series standard
deviation, which is not biased in the presence of
cross-sectional dependence (Lyon et al., 1999).
The abnormal returns are estimated relative to the
acquirer industry and size matched control firms
described in Section 4.1 above. The control firm
approach is preferred to a reference portfolio
approach because it avoids both the skewness and
rebalancing biases (see, e.g. Barber and Lyon,
1997). The skewness bias occurs if the distribution
of long-run abnormal stock returns is skewed
positively. The rebalancing bias occurs because
the compound returns of a reference portfolio, such
as a market index, are calculated assuming periodic
rebalancing. As with the accounting rate of return
methodology, where acquirers die within the
36 post-takeover months, the month of death is
the final month of evaluation.16
4.3. Fundamental valuation methodology
To measure the effect of takeover on fundamental
value, we examine the difference between the pre-
acquisition expected fundamental value of acquir-
ing firms and the realised post-acquisition funda-
mental value. If acquisitions create fundamental
value, then the difference should be positive. The
valuation method we use to measure fundamental
value is the residual income valuation (RIV)
method (Preinreich, 1938; Edwards and Bell,
1961; Peasnell, 1982; Stark, 1986; Feltham and
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13 Following FRS 10 in 1998, UK acquirers using acquisition
accounting were no longer allowed to immediately write off
goodwill to reserves.
14 Higson (1998) shows that acquirers tended to write down
the values of acquired assets below book values. The effect of
this is to inflate goodwill on acquisition, and writing off this
goodwill reduces equity book values, hence improving post-
acquisition return on equity. This would cause an upward bias to
the profitability results.
15 Conn et al. (2005) calculate average pairwise correlations
of annual BHARs for all acquirers that complete acquisitions in
the samemonth, the grand average for which is 0.008. They then
assume that the average correlation for overlapping observa-
tions is linear in the number of months of calendar time overlap,
ranging from zero for non-overlapping observations to the
estimated average correlation of 0.008 for acquirers with
complete overlap.
16 In additional tests we instead replace the remaining
acquirer missing months with the return for the control firm.
The results using this alternative method are very similar.
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Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson, 1995). In this section, we
present the basic RIV model and adapt it for our
particular study.
4.3.1. The RIV model
The RIV model rests on three basic assumptions.
First, fundamental value equals the present value of
expected dividends:
Vt ¼
X?
i¼1
Et½Dtþi
ð1þ reÞi
ð3Þ
where Vt is the stock’s fundamental valuation at
time t, Et[∙] = expectation based on information
available at time t, Dt+i = dividends for period t+i,
and re = cost of equity capital.
Second, the clean surplus accounting relation
states that all changes in the book value of equity
pass through the income statement:
Bt ¼ Bt1 þNIt Dt ð4Þ
where Bt = book value of equity at time t and NIt =
net income for period t. This assumption allows
dividends to be expressed in terms of future
earnings and book values. Combining the clean
surplus relation in Equation (4) with Equation (3)
and rearranging yields:
Vt ¼ Bt þ
X?
i¼1
Et½NItþi  re:Btþi1
ð1þ reÞi
 Et½Btþ?ð1þ reÞ? ð5Þ
The final term in Equation (5) is assumed to be zero.
The second term is the present value of future
residual income. Hence fundamental value equals
the sum of book value and the present value of
future residual income.
Vt ¼ Bt þ
X?
i¼1
Et½ðNItþi  reBtþi1
ð1þ reÞi
ð6Þ
Practical application of Equation (6) necessitates a
truncated forecast horizon with an assumption
regarding the terminal value at the horizon. Over a
finite horizon, the model can be modified to include
a terminal value estimate as follows:
Vt ¼ Bt þ
XT
i¼1
Et½ðNItþi  reBtþi1
ð1þ reÞi
þ EtþT½ðNItþT  reBtþT1ð1þ reÞtþT1re
ð7Þ
The second term on the right hand side of
Equation (7) represents abnormal earnings in the
first T periods and the third term represents the
‘terminal value’, measured as the abnormal earnings
of period t+T, discounted in perpetuity assuming no
further growth in B after year T.
4.3.2. Adopting the RIV model to measure the
impact of acquisition on the fundamental values of
acquirers
To measure the impact of an acquisition on the
fundamental value of the acquiring firm, we calcu-
late the realised fundamental value of the acquirer
following the acquisition and compare this with the
expected fundamental value of the acquirer prior to
acquisition.
Equation (7) is our starting point for estimating
the former. We choose a forecast horizon of four
years of accounting performance following acqui-
sition, in order to ensure consistency with the
profitability and event study methodologies
described above. Equation (7) is hence first modi-
fied as follows for the realised post-acquisition
value of the acquirer:
Vpost ¼ B1 þNI 0  re:B1ð1þ reÞ þ
NI1  re:B0
ð1þ reÞ2
þNI2  re:B1ð1þ reÞ3
þNI3  re:B2ð1þ reÞ3re
ð8Þ
The first term is book value in year 1, the last
accounting year before completion of the acquisi-
tion. Year 0 is the year of consolidation, the
accounting year following the completion date of
the acquisition. The second, third and fourth terms
describe residual income in years 0, 1 and 2. The
fifth term describes the terminal value, which is the
abnormal earnings of year 3 discounted in perpetu-
ity.
Acquisitions often involve issuing shares to the
acquired firm’s shareholders as a method of
payment. Issuing new shares can increase total
fundamental value whilst reducing value per share,
and therefore we must focus on the impact of an
acquisition on the per share fundamental value
rather than the overall fundamental value (Penman,
2007: 94). We therefore divide each term in
Equation (8) by the number of shares to get per
share values as follows:
Vpost ¼ BPS1 þ EPS0  re:BPS1ð1þ reÞ
þ EPSþ1  re:BPS0ð1þ reÞ2
þ EPS2  re:BPS1ð1þ reÞ3
þ EPS3  re:BPS2ð1þ reÞ3re
ð9Þ
where BPS is book equity per share, and EPS is net
income (earnings) per share.17
In the absence of any violations of clean surplus
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/8/2010 02 ABR Guest.3d Page 339 of 352
17 Other residual income studies also calculate fundamental
value on a per share basis (e.g. Penman and Sougiannis, 1998).
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accounting, we can use Equation (9) to estimate the
realised fundamental value of the acquirer follow-
ing the acquisition. However, in the case of
acquisitions, there are potential violations of clean
surplus accounting (discussed below) in year 0,
which impact book value in year 0 but do not pass
through the income statement in year 0. In order to
avoid these dirty surplus effects in our estimate of
post-acquisition fundamental value, rather than
include book value from year 1 and residual
income from year 0 (as in Equation (9)), we replace
these terms with book value and dividends from
year 0 as follows:18
Vpost ¼ DPS0ð1þ reÞ þ
BPS0
ð1þ reÞ þ
EPS 1  re:BPS0
ð1þ reÞ2
þ EPS2  re:BPS1ð1þ reÞ3
þ EPS3  re:BPS 2ð1þ reÞ3re
ð10Þ
The first two terms are dividends per share (DPS)
and book value per share (BPS) in year 0. The last
three terms are the same as in Equation (9).
Equation (10) avoids dirty surplus effects because
by year 0, the dirty surplus effect on book value has
already occurred. Therefore, any change in future
residual income caused by the altered book value
(i.e. cost of equity multiplied by book value, terms
3, 4 and 5 in Equation (9)) is offset by the altered
book value in year 0 (term 2 in Equation (10)). Note
that Equations (9) and (10) give identical valuations
if there is no violation of clean surplus accounting in
year 0.19
Let us first assume that cash, rather than shares, is
used to pay for the acquisition. The first reason for
dirty surplus accounting effects in acquisitions is
the method of accounting used. While the acquisi-
tion method with goodwill capitalisation, with or
without amortisation, creates no dirty surplus effect,
immediate goodwill write-off (or merger account-
ing) violates clean surplus accounting in year 0.
However, neither method affects Equation (10)
because any change in book value in year 0 exactly
offsets the corresponding change in discounted
future earnings (Penman, 2004: 577–578).20 Thus,
with Equation (10), whether merger or acquisition
accounting is used, goodwill is immediately written
off or capitalised, or if capitalised, held with or
without amortisation, leaves post-acquisition value
unaffected.21 However, it should be noted that if
goodwill is amortised, Equation (10) is affected by
whether the earnings per share (EPS) figure used in
the terminal value calculation includes the amort-
isation charge or not, because this calculation
should be based on steady state EPS (i.e. with no
amortisation). In practice, Equation (10) can be
adjusted by adding amortisation back to EPS and
book value per share (Penman, 2001: 653–654).22
The second reason for dirty surplus accounting
effects is the issue of shares to pay for the
acquisition. So far we have assumed that the
acquisition is paid for with cash and in this case
only if goodwill is written off is there a dirty surplus
effect. However, if instead the acquisition is funded
by shares, there is always an increase in the book
value of the acquirer that bypasses the income
statement, and hence, irrespective of the accounting
method used, there is always a dirty surplus
accounting effect in year 0. Compared to year 1,
from year 0 onwards the acquiring firm’s share-
holders now additionally own the book value of the
target company and its future residual income. In
exchange, the acquiring firm’s shareholders give the
acquired firm’s shareholders a share in the post-
acquisition fundamental value of the acquirer. The
size of this share, determined by the number of
shares given to the acquired firm’s shareholders,
determines whether or not the acquisition creates
value for the acquirer’s pre-acquisition sharehold-
ers. Equation (10) incorporates both these impacts
of the acquisition, because it measures fundamental
value from year 0 onwards and does so on a per
share basis.23 The number of shares issued to target
shareholders can be a source of fundamental value
creation or destruction for pre-acquisition share-
holders. For example, the acquirer can create
fundamental value by using an artificially low
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/8/2010 02 ABR Guest.3d Page 340 of 352
18 See Penman (2007: 570) for a broad description of this
approach.
19 This and the subsequent assertions in this section are
shown numerically in a seperate document which is available
from the first author on request.
20 In contrast, applying Equation (9) to such cases results in
an upwardly biased value (assuming goodwill is positive)
because the lower book value results in a lower capital charge,
increasing residual income.
21 For UK listed firms, violations of clean surplus accounting
due to the accounting method used for acquisitions are no longer
a concern since 2004. IFRS3 (IASB, 2004) banned the use of
merger accounting for all EU listed firms, banning the use for
any firms applying IFRS 3 who must instead use purchase
accounting and hold goodwill with impairment. (Although
FRS10 (ASB, 1998) banned the dirty-surplus immediate write
off of goodwill with purchase accounting for UK firms, merger
accounting was still allowed in the UK until IFRS3 and hence
dirty surplus violations continued to some extent for UK listed
firms between 1998 and 2004).
22 Because only a small number of our sample acquirers
capitalise goodwill, and hence potentially amortise, we address
this potential bias by excluding such acquirers in our robustness
tests in Section 5 below.
23 Another problem is that in the year of the share issue, the
capital charge is estimated based on the previous year’s book
value, when in fact it should be estimated relative to the previous
year’s book value plus the share issue value. Equation (10) also
avoids this problem.
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number of overvalued shares to pay for the
acquisition. Equation (10) incorporates this
gain to pre-acquisition acquirer shareholders.
Alternatively, the acquirer can destroy fundamental
value by issuing an artificially high number of
undervalued shares to pay for the acquisition.
Again, Equation (10) incorporates this loss to pre-
acquisition acquirer shareholders. Although in our
discussion we focus on the two extremes of either
all cash or all equity methods of payment,
Equation (10) covers all other alternatives such as
a cash–share alternative.24
To estimate the forecast fundamental value prior
to acquisition, we forecast the same measures (that
are realised in Equation (10)) in the year before
acquisition (year 1), as follows:
Vpre ¼ E1ðDPS0Þð1þ reÞ þ
E1ðBPS0Þ
ð1þ reÞ
þ E1ðEPS1  re:BPS0Þð1þ reÞ2
þ E1ðEPS2  re:BPS1Þð1þ reÞ3
þ E1ðEPS3  re:BPS2Þð1þ reÞ3re
ð11Þ
The expectation in Equation (11) is conditioned on
the absence (or no knowledge) of the acquisition. A
comparison of Equations (10) and (11) gives the
impact of acquisition on the fundamental value per
share of pre-acquisition acquirer shareholders as
follows:
DV ¼ Vpost  Vpre ð12Þ
If (12) is positive, then the takeover creates value for
pre-acquisition acquirer shareholders.
In order to make this measure comparable across
firms, we calculate the percentage change in value
for each acquirer as follows:
%DV ¼ ðVpost  VpreÞ=Vpre ð13Þ
Using a percentage change measure allows us to
compare firms with different valuations. The
approach we adopt is broadly similar to that of
Morton and Neill (2000) who examine the effect of
corporate restructurings on fundamental value.
To control for performance changes that may
have occurred in the absence of a takeover, such as
macroeconomic and industry performance changes,
we also estimate Equation (13) for the acquirer
industry and size-matched control firms described
in Section 3 above.25,26 Comparing the acquirer
with its matched control firm (rather than a mixture
of acquirer and acquiree benchmarks), is the
appropriate benchmark because we are interested
in comparing the acquirer’s performance with what
would have happened in the absence of the
takeover. In the case of non-horizontal acquisitions,
the implicit assumption is that the acquirer would
not have entered the target’s industry in the absence
of a takeover.27 Taking the difference in the
percentage change in fundamental value between
acquirers and control firms (the abnormal change in
fundamental value) is analogous to estimating the
abnormal share return over the announcement and
post-acquisition periods. The abnormal change in
fundamental value corresponds in theory to what
the share return on the announcement of the
acquisition would be if stock prices were efficient
and there had been no prior anticipation of the
acquisition.
4.3.3. Estimation procedure for the RIV model
We now turn to the practical implementation of the
RIV model. The estimation techniques involved in
its implementation require a number of assump-
tions. The techniques and assumptions that we
employ are designed to be consistent with those
used in other RIV studies. However, because the
results may be sensitive to these techniques and
assumptions, we later return to check the robustness
of our results to these methods.
For our pre-acquisition valuation, we estimate
future EPS by multiplying forecast ROE by
predicted beginning of year book value per share
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/8/2010 02 ABR Guest.3d Page 341 of 352
24 Another issue related to the method of financing is any
change in capital structure around acquisition. If acquisitions are
associated with an increase in leverage, this automatically
causes an increase in the return on equity. However, with our
fundamental value approach (in contrast to the ROE profitability
approach described above), the cost of equity should increase to
reflect the higher financial risk due to higher gearing.
25 Our matched control firm approach is an attempt to
establish a counterfactual for the acquirer in the hypothetical
situation where the acquisition does not take place. Our choice
of counterfactual may be misspecified if acquirers differ from
non-acquirers on factors other than size and industry, and these
factors impact subsequent performance. Other studies are, of
course, also subject to this potential misspecification.
26 Ritter and Warr (2002) argue that the RIV model tends to
undervalue (overvalue) stocks in high (low) inflation periods.
However, the matched control sample is aligned in calendar
time, and mitigates this effect.
27 A similar implicit assumption is made in share return
studies, which compare the acquirer with a matched control firm
only. In diversifying acquisitions, if a higher price is paid for
targets in well performing industries, controlling for acquiree
industry performance incorrectly biases downwards the value
impact of such acquisitions, since the fundamental value
approach incorporates the acquisition price. In contrast, prof-
itability studies do not incorporate the acquistion price and are
concerned with whether the combined performance of the
acquirer and acquiree improves following acquisition, and
hence it is appropriate to employ a mixture of acquirer and
acquiree benchmarks.
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in each future year. Our forecast of future ROE is
the acquirer’s average ROE in years 3 to 1.
Using pre-acquisition historical ROE to predict
future ROE is consistent with our (and other)
takeover profitability studies and previous applica-
tions of the residual income model (e.g. Frankel and
Lee, 1998; Lee et al., 1999).28
We estimate book value per share for year 0 as
book value per share in year 1, to which we add
forecast EPS in year 0 minus expected dividends per
share in year 0. We estimate book value per share
for year 1 as estimated book value per share in year
0, to which we add forecast EPS less expected
dividends per share in year 1, and so on for years 2
and 3.
We estimate future dividends per share as
forecast EPS multiplied by estimated dividend
payout ratio. Our estimated payout ratio is the
average dividend payout ratio in years 3 to 1. If
any of the years 3 to 1 have negative earnings,
we exclude these years from the calculation. We are
unable to apply this method in two cases. If a firm
has negative earnings in all three pre-acquisition
years we are unable to estimate a payout ratio. If
forecast EPS is negative we are unable to multiply
by a payout ratio to estimate future dividends. In
both cases we set future dividends to the level of
dividends in year 1.
For the cost of equity (re) we calculate a firm-
specific, time-varying discount rate using the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). For the
CAPM discount rate, at the financial year-end in
years 1 to 3, sample firm betas are calculated by
Datastream (Datastream Item E058) using the
previous 240 trading day share returns. We employ
a market risk premium of 2.81%, estimated for the
UK (over the years 1989–1998) by Claus and
Thomas (2001). The risk free rate is the UK three-
month Treasury bill rate at each financial year-end.
The cost of equity at year 1 is used for the pre-
takeover valuation, whilst the average cost of equity
over years 0 to 3 is used for the post-takeover
valuation.
It is important to allow for a time-varying, firm-
specific discount rate because acquiring firms
experience a significant increase in leverage and
the cost of equity following acquisition. Relative to
control firms, the average acquiring firm’s gearing
ratio (long-term debt/long-term debt plus plus
market capitalisation) increases by 3.34% following
acquisition (year 1 compared to the average over
years 0 to 3). This increase is statistically significant
at the 1% level, and is consistent with previous
studies (i.e. Ghosh and Jain, 2000).29 The acquirers’
average beta increases from 0.72 to 0.78 following
the acquisition, whereas the control firms’ average
beta is constant at 0.68. In year 1, the acquirers’
average discount rate is 11.77, increasing to an
average of 11.94% over years 0 to 3, whereas the
control firms’ average discount rate decreases from
11.66% to 11.64%. The abnormal changes in beta
and the cost of equity are significant at 1%.
If the terminal value is negative, we restrict it to
be zero (for both the pre- and post-analysis), since
over a long horizon, managers are not expected ex
ante to invest in negative net present value projects
(D’Mello and Shroff, 2000). If acquirers die within
the four post-takeover years then the year of death
becomes the final year of analysis and we estimate a
terminal value using the same method used for
surviving acquirers at the end of year 3.30 In other
words, we assume the final year earnings are earned
in perpetuity. As with the profitability and share
return results, each variable is winsorised at the 10th
and 90th percentiles.
In contrast to profitability studies, our method
calculates the change in fundamental value follow-
ing acquisition and thus quantifies the total dis-
counted value effect of takeover on the acquirer. In
contrast to event studies, it measures the change in
fundamental value rather than the change in market
value. As such, it is less reliant on stock prices.
However, it is not completely independent ofmarket
prices because the estimation of beta and hence the
cost of equity relies on stock market efficiency.
5. Empirical results
In this section we report the empirical results.
Section 5.1 describes the profitability results,
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/8/2010 02 ABR Guest.3d Page 342 of 352
28 Alternatively, some previous RIV applications use analyst
forecasts to predict EPS (Ang and Cheng, 2006; Dong et al.,
2006). In the context of our study, we prefer to use prior ROE as
a predictor for several reasons. First, past ROE is used to predict
future profitability in takeover profitability studies and hence its
use facilitates comparison between the profitability and RIV
methods, a key objective of our study. Second, analyst forecasts
may already incorporate expectations of future acquisitions and
hence bias any valuation impact towards zero (the share return
methodology has the same drawback). Third, analyst forecasts
are biased and do not predict future earnings any better than
historic earning models (Capstaff et al., 1995; Bi and Gregory,
2008). Finally, these forecasts are not available for the entire
sample period and would therefore reduce sample size.
29We also use a book value measure of gearing calculated as
long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus book value of
shareholders equity. The results are similar, showing an increase
in leverage relative to control firms of 3.67%, significant at 1%.
30We could employ the last market value prior to death as the
terminal value. We prefer not to rely on market values since the
main source of death is acquisition and market values include
bid premiums that may have little to do with fundamental value.
We do, however, employ this method in our robustness tests
below.
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Section 5.2 the share return results, and Section 5.3
the fundamental value results.
5.1. Profitability results
Table 2 (on p. 344) reports results using the
traditional accounting performance measure.
Panel A reports the pre-takeover performance.
In year 3, the combined acquirer–target per-
formance is a significant 1.5% lower than control
firms. In year 2, the combined acquirer–target
performance is no different from control firms,
whilst in year 1 the performance is 1% higher
(significant at 10%). The average abnormal
performance over years 3 to 1 is close to
zero and statistically insignificant. Panel B reports
the results for the post-takeover period. Over
years 1 to 3, the abnormal performance is
significantly positive in every year, and the
average over years 1 to 3 is a significant
2.66%. Panel C reports that the difference
between the post- and pre-takeover abnormal
performance is a significant 2.62%, indicating that
takeovers result in a significant improvement in
return on equity. Panel D reports the results of a
regression of post-takeover performance on pre-
takeover performance. The intercept is a signifi-
cant 2.61, similar to the abnormal change in Panel
C.31 These results suggest that the combined
performance of the acquirer and acquiree
improves significantly following an acquisition.
We find no evidence that our results are sensitive
to the methods we employ to deal with extreme
observations. Employing 5% and 1% winsorisation
levels makes no difference to our results and using
median figures and a Wilcoxon test gives a median
abnormal change in profitability of 1.79% with a
Z-value of 3.62. Hence again, our key finding is
unchanged.
The results indicate that takeovers significantly
improve merging firms’ return on equity. This
improvement in performance is consistent with
other UK studies for our time period that employ
different measures of performance and sample
selection procedures. Chatterjee and Meeks (1996)
employ a profit before interest and tax measure and
also find a significant improvement. Similarly,
Manson et al. (1994), Manson et al. (2000),
Powell and Stark (2005) and Cosh et al. (2006)
employ an operating performance to market value
measure and find evidence of significant improve-
ments.32
Manson et al. (1994) and Manson et al. (2000)
employ a different sample selection procedure both
from our study and Chatterjee and Meeks (1996),
Powell and Stark (2005) and Cosh et al. (2006) by
only selecting merging firms that have full data
available for the years surrounding the acquisition,
and are not contaminated by other significant
acquisitions in the two years surrounding the
acquisition. The consistency in the results of these
studies suggests that the finding of improved
performance is robust to different sample selection
procedures. However, for robustness, we carry out a
similar sample selection procedure to Manson et al.
(2000). First, we exclude sample acquisitions if they
are preceded or followed by a significant acquisition
within three calendar years of the acquisition year.
We define a significant acquisition as one in which
the transaction size is greater than one-third of the
acquirer’s market value. This results in 44 acquisi-
tions being excluded.33 Second, we exclude acqui-
sitions if either the acquirer, target or control firm
data are not available for the full three years before
or after acquisition. This results in a further
90 acquisitions being excluded. The results for the
remaining subsample of 169 acquisitions are similar
to those for the full sample and hence our results are
robust to these alternative sample selection require-
ments.
We also check the impact on the results of our
treatment of goodwill, by removing from the
analysis the 34 acquirers that capitalise goodwill.
The change in profitability (as measured by the
regression intercept) for this subsample of
269 acquisitions is 2.44%, significant at 1%, and
similar to the full sample results.
We conclude that overall, there is a significant
improvement in merging firms’ return on equity
post-takeover.
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31 As pointed out in Section 4.1 above, the fact that the
abnormal change in profitability is similar to the regression
intercept indicates that for our sample the regression results are
not biased by (unmatched) permanent drivers of profitability, a
concern of Ghosh (2001).
32 The improvement in return on equity may be due to an
increase in leverage. However, we examine separately the 175
acquisitions where gearing increases relative to control firms
and find that the improvement in return on equity is 2.10% and
hence similar to that for the full sample. A further possible
explanation for the profitability improvement is that acquirers
wrote down fair values and immediately wrote off the inflated
goodwill to reserves (Chatterjee and Meeks, 1996). However,
Manson et al. (1994), Manson et al. (2000), Powell and Stark
(2005) and Cosh et al. (2006) avoid this potential bias by using a
range of denominators and still report significant performance
improvements.
33 This approach has advantages and disadvantages. An
advantage of an uncontaminated sample is that it focuses on a
single event for each acquirer. A disadvantage is that this
method is more likely to exclude frequent acquirers, and their
performance may be different from other acquirers (see,
e.g. Conn et al., 2004).
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5.2. Share return results
Table 3 reports abnormal share returns over the
announcement period and the 36-month post-
acquisition period. Over the announcement month,
the acquirer abnormal return is 1.72%, significant
at 1%.34 Over the 36-month post-acquisition period,
the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 15.61%,
significant at 1%. The calendar time average
monthly abnormal return is 0.45%, and also
statistically significant at the 1% level. We conclude
that both at the time of the announcement and over
the long run following the acquisition, acquirer
share returns are significantly negative. These
results are consistent with other studies of UK
acquirers over this sample period such as Gregory
(1997), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and Conn
et al. (2005).
As with the profitability tests, we check our
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Table 2
The effect of takeover on profitability
Year relative to takeover No. ROE (%)
Sample
firms
t-test Control
firms
t-test Abnormal t-test
Panel A: Pre-takeover profitability
–3 219 13.19 14.67 –1.47b (–2.56)
–2 265 15.43 15.65 –0.21 (–0.36)
–1 303 17.17 16.18 0.99c (1.72)
Mean 3 to 1 303 15.88 15.84 0.04 (0.07)
Panel B: Post-takeover profitability
0 303 21.50 16.25 5.26a (7.77)
1 303 19.96 16.25 3.71a (5.69)
2 286 18.05 15.72 2.34a (3.51)
3 269 17.24 15.34 1.90a (2.80)
Mean 1 to 3 303 18.60 15.94 2.66a (4.56)
Panel C: Difference between pre-takeover and post-takeover profitability
(Mean 1 to 3) minus
(mean 3 to 1)
303 2.72a (4.53) 0.10 (0.18) 2.62a (3.85)
Panel D: Results of abnormal post-takeover profitability (mean 1 to 3) regressed on abnormal pre-
takeover profitability (mean –3 to –1)
Α t–stat Β t–stat R2 No.
2.61a (4.24) 29.68a (4.57) 0.07 303
Notes
This table reports the impact of takeover on profitability. Our measure of profitability is return on equity
(ROE), defined as net income divided by shareholder funds. Panel A reports profitability over each of the
three pre-takeover years, and the average for all three years. For sample firms, the return in years 3 to 1
is the weighted average of bidder and target, with the weights being the equity book values of the two firms
in year 1. For each acquisition, a non-merging control firm is selected for both the target and acquirer,
matched on industry and size in year 1. Control firm profitability is the weighted average profitability of
the two control firms, weighted by the book equity values of the bidder and target in year 1. Abnormal
performance is measured relative to these control firms. Panel B reports profitability over each of the four
post-takeover years (year 0 is the year of consolidation), and the average for years 1 to 3. For years 0 to 3
the sample firm return is the acquirer return. Panel C reports the simple difference between the post-takeover
profitability measured over years 1 to 3, and the pre-takeover profitability measured over years 3 to 1.
Panel D reports the results of an OLS regression of abnormal post-takeover performance on abnormal pre-
takeover performance. Each of the annual profitability measures for both the sample firms and control firms
are winsorised at the 10% level. a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively,
using a two-tailed test.
34 Abnormal returns calculated over a three-day window
starting one day prior to the announcement date, and relative to
the market index, are a similar magnitude and significant at 1%.
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results for the subsample of uncontaminated acqui-
sitions (described in Section 5.1) with full data
availability. Abnormal returns for this subsample
are significantly negative in both the announcement
month and over the long run, consistent with the full
sample results. Again, as with the profitability tests,
we find no evidence that our results are sensitive to
the methods we employ to deal with extreme
observations. Data based on 5 and 1%winsorisation
levels also result in significantly negative returns
over the announcement month and post-acquisition
period. Furthermore, using median figures and a
Wilcoxon test produces similar results. Although as
noted in Section 4.2, the control firm approach we
employ should eliminate the skewness bias, for
robustness we also estimate a bootstrapped skew-
ness-adjusted t–test for the buy-and-hold abnormal
returns (Lyon et al., 1999). We use the hallt program
in Stata, drawing 1,000 bootstrapped resamples of
size 75 from the sample of 300 (following Lyon et
al., 1999). This alternative t-test has a value of
3.91 and hence is very consistent with the t-test in
Table 3.
Our results so far are consistent with previous
studies for our sample period: UK acquisitions have
a significantly positive impact on profitability but a
significantly negative impact on share returns. We
now turn to the fundamental valuation analysis.
5.3. Fundamental value results
In this section we report the results of the RIV
approach. Table 4 below reports the results of
estimating Equation (13) and the component parts
for acquirers and control firms. Panel A reports the
pre-takeover valuation, Panel B the post-takeover
valuation, and Panel C the differences between the
two. For each sample acquisition, the pre- and post-
takeover value component parts and total values are
normalised by the total pre-takeover value and
multiplied by 100. Thus, for each sample firm, the
normalised total pre-takeover value takes the value
of 100. The differences in Panel C are the differ-
ences between each of these normalised values.
Hence, the difference in total values is a difference
in percentages and the differences in components
show how this is divided among the individual
components.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the components of pre-
acquisition fundamental value of the acquirers and
their control firms. This consists of forecast book
value at year 0, forecast dividends in year 0, forecast
residual income over years 1 to 2, and forecast
terminal value. These figures are 67.35, 3.57, 2.27
and 25.83 as proportions of pre-acquisition funda-
mental value. As a proportion of total pre-acquisi-
tion value, acquiring firms have lower book value
but higher forecast residual income and terminal
value.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the post-takeover
fundamental value and its components for acquirers
and control firms, as proportions of pre-acquisition
value. This consists of book value in year 0, realised
dividends in year 0, realised residual income in
years 1 to 2, forecast terminal value, and total value.
Each of these values is higher than those forecast in
Panel A, for both acquirers and control firms (the
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Table 3
The effect of takeover on the announcement and long-run share returns of the acquirer
Time period No. Share returns (%)
Acquirer Control firm Abnormal t-test
Announcement month 300 1.50 3.22 –1.72a (–3.45)
Post-acquisition buy-and-hold 300 27.68 43.29 –15.61a (–3.42)
Post-acquisition calendar time 300 0.91 1.35 –0.45a (–3.07)
Notes
This table reports the share returns of the acquirer over the announcement month and the long-run post-
acquisition period following acquisition completion. For each acquirer, a non-merging control firm is
matched on industry and size in the year prior to the acquisition (year 1). Abnormal returns over both
periods are measured relative to this control firm. The announcement month return is the average monthly
return over the calendar month in which the acquisition is announced. The post-acquisition buy-and-hold
return is the buy-and-hold return over the 36-month period following the end of the announcement period
(the end of the completion month). The t–statistic for the post-acquisition buy-and-hold return is adjusted for
cross-sectional dependence as described in the text. The raw announcement month and buy-and-hold returns
for both acquirers and control firms are winsorised at the 10% level. Calendar months with less than ten
observations have been excluded from the analysis. a, b, c indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%
respectively, using a two-tailed test.
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exception being book value for control firms). The
components of post-acquisition value are not,
however, significantly different between acquirers
and control firms. The post-takeover value of
acquirers of 120.14 is insignificantly different
from the figure of 124.70 for control firms.
Panel C of Table 4 reports the differences
between the figures in Panels A and B (the pre-
and post-takeover valuations and their component
parts) and significance levels. Acquirers experience
a significant increase in book value per share in
year 0. Of the 20.14% increase in total value, 2.50%
is due to an increase in book value. In contrast,
control firms’ book value is unchanged, and the
abnormal change in book value is significantly
positive. Dividends and residual income are also
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Table 4
The effect of acquisition on the fundamental value of acquirers
Variable Fundamental value
Acquirer t-test Control
firm
t-test Abnormal t-test
Panel A: Pre-acquisition value
Book value in year 0 67.35 72.94 –5.59a (–2.80)
Dividends in year 0 3.57 3.59 –0.03 (–0.21)
Residual income in years 1 to 2 2.27 0.92 1.34a (2.62)
Terminal value 25.83 21.95 3.88a (2.44)
Total value 100.00 100.00 0.00
Panel B: Post-acquisition value
Book value in year 0 69.85 71.63 –1.78 (–0.73)
Dividends in year 0 3.87 3.82 0.06 (0.38)
Residual income in years 1 to 2 3.91 3.50 0.41 (0.70)
Terminal value 39.05 41.43 –2.38 (–0.92)
Total value 120.14 124.70 –4.55 (–1.02)
Panel C: Difference between post-
and pre-acquisition values
Book value 2.50B (2.05) –1.30 (–1.49) 3.81b (2.54)
Dividends 0.31B (3.34) 0.22a (3.00) 0.08 (0.72)
Residual income in years 1 to 2 1.65a (2.98) 2.58a (4.02) –0.93 (–1.30)
Terminal value 13.22a (4.88) 19.49a (7.12) –6.27c (–1.92)
Total value 20.14a (5.57) 24.70a (6.96) –4.55 (–1.02)
Notes
This table reports the fundamental value of the sample acquirers before and after acquisition. Each acquirer
is matched with a non-merging control firm on industry and size in the year before the acquisition (year
1). Abnormal fundamental value is measured relative to the control firm. Panel A reports the components
of pre-acquisition fundamental value of the acquirers and their control firms. This consists of book value in
year 1, forecast dividends in year 0, forecast residual income over years 1 to 2, and forecast terminal
value. Panel B reports the post-takeover fundamental value and its components for acquirers and control
firms. This consists of book value in year 0, realised dividends in year 0, residual income in years 1 to 2,
and forecast terminal value. Panel C reports the difference between the total post- and pre-takeover values
and their components. For each sample acquisition, the pre- and post-takeover value component parts and
total values are normalised by the total pre-takeover value, and multiplied by 100. Thus, for each sample
firm, the normalised total pre-takeover value takes the value of 100. The differences in Panel C are the
differences between each of these normalised values. Hence, the difference in total values is a difference in
percentages and the differences in components show how this is divided among the individual components.
The figures reported are means, with t-values in parentheses. All of the raw figures (both total value and
component parts, columns 1–2 and Panels A–B) are winsorised at the 10% level. Because the component
parts are winsorised as well as the total values, the total values are not the precise sum of the component
parts. a, b, c indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% using a two-tailed test.
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significantly higher than forecast for acquirers and
control firms, but the differences between acquirers
and control firms are not significant. Actual terminal
value increases significantly compared to the fore-
cast terminal value for both acquirers and control
firms. However, the increase for acquirers is
significantly lower than that for control firms.
The difference in total fundamental value for
acquirers is 20.14% and 24.70% for control firms,
both of which are significantly different from zero,
but the difference is insignificant (t = 1.02).
Therefore, our main conclusion is that acquisitions
have a statistically insignificant effect on the
acquirers’ fundamental value.
5.3.1. Checking the robustness of the RIV results
In this section we carry out a range of checks to
ensure that our main conclusion, that acquisitions
result in an insignificant effect on fundamental
value, is robust.
As Table 4 shows, the abnormal change in
terminal value is significantly negative. The meas-
ure we use to calculate terminal value is EPS in
year 3. This forecast is important because the
terminal value is a large component of total
fundamental value. If instead we use the average
EPS over years 1 to 3 to forecast terminal value, the
total abnormal change in fundamental value is an
insignificant 0.49%. Therefore, although the
change is higher, our key finding of an insignificant
impact is unchanged. Furthermore, we believe
year 3 earnings is the appropriate estimate of
terminal value because post-acquisition ROE
declines linearly over years 0 to 3. For acquirers,
abnormal ROE in year 3 is 13.57%, compared to a
pre-takeover abnormal ROE of 11.44%, a differ-
ence that is not statistically significant. We believe it
would be inappropriate to use a forecast of terminal
value based on the higher values in the years
immediately following the acquistion. As further
evidence for this claim, average acquirer abnormal
ROE over years 4 to 5 is 11.70%, and thus lower
still than ROE in year 3.35
We also examine the impact of our assumptions
regarding the payout ratio. Predicted fundamental
value may differ from realised fundamental value if
the actual payout ratio differs from the predicted
payout ratio. If acquirers increase their dividend
payments, there is less book value on which to
generate future residual income. Additional tests
show that acquirers increase their payout ratio in
year 0 by 1.8%, compared to a zero change for
control firms. To check the robustness of our results,
we calculate pre-takeover forecast book values
using the average payout ratio in years 0 to 3, rather
than the payout ratio in year 1. Our results are
similar using this alternative method, with an
insignificant abnormal change of 3.71%
(t = 0.85). For firms with negative earnings in
all three pre-acquisition years (3,2 and1) or a
forecast negative EPS, we assume that future
dividends equal the level of dividends in year 1.
We test the sensitivity of our results to this
assumption by re-running our tests for the sub-
sample of 287 acquisitions in which these condi-
tions don’t hold for both acquirers and control firms.
Our results are unchanged for this subsample,
which has an abnormal change in fundamental
value of 3.27 (t = 0.76).
There are some potential concerns about the
estimated cost of equity. First, betas estimated with
daily data could be downward biased because of
thin trading.36 However, the Datastream estimation
technique controls for this problem and, further-
more, the same potential problem exists for control
firms, and therefore any downward bias should also
apply to control firms and therefore on average be
controlled for. However, to control for this further,
we exclude 74 acquisitions for which the acquiring
firms have an average beta of less than 0.5. The
fundamental value impact for the remaining
229 acquisitions is 3.82 (t = 0.73) which is
similar to the impact for the full sample. In an
additional test, we also estimate beta ourselves for
acquirers and control firms by regressing monthly
returns on the UK stock market return for both the
pre- and post-acquisition 36-month periods. Our
results are very similar using this estimation of beta,
with the abnormal change in fundamental value
being 3.61 with a t-statistic of 0.76. The second
concern is that the results are biased upwards
because increased post-acquistion leverage
improves net income, and hence fundamental
value, but is not reflected in a higher cost of capital
because of a lack of association between gearing
and beta. However, we find evidence of a strong
association, with the correlation coefficient between
the abnormal change in leverage and the abnormal
change in the cost of equity being a significant
0.114. Lastly, to test the sensitivity of our results to
the increase in the cost of equity, we employ a
constant discount rate based on the historical UK
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35 Given this finding, we repeated our profitability tests using
five years pre- and post-takeover rather than three years. We still
found evidence of a statistically significant improvement in
profitability.
36 For acquiring firms, average beta over the pre- and post-
acquisition periods is 0.76, with a median of 0.79, a minimum of
0.15 and a maximum of 1.26.
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equity return of 10.2% (Dimson et al., 2000), for
both acquirers and control firms. In this case the
total abnormal change in fundamental value is an
insignificant 2.93%, which is only marginally
higher than the change in value using the time
varying rate. Therefore, although the cost of equity
increases following acquisition, this can at best only
explain part of the difference between the profit-
ability and RIV approaches.
As noted above, if acquirers or control firms die
within the four post-takeover years then the year of
death becomes the final year of analysis, for both the
acquirer and the control firm, and we estimate a
terminal value at that time using the EPS for the last
year prior to death. We test the sensitivity of our
results to this approach in two ways. First, we
recalculate our results after excluding the 34 sample
firms that die before the end of year 3. The abnormal
change for this subsample is 1.00% (t = 0.22)
and hence similar to the results for the full sample.
Second, we use the last market value of the firm
prior to death for the 34 firms as an estimate of
terminal value. In this case, the abnormal change in
fundamental value is 2.93 (t = 0.63), and, although
positive rather than negative, is still statistically
insignificant and hence consistent with our key
finding of an insignificant impact.
We examine whether our results are sensitive to
the methods we employ to deal with extreme
observations. First, we employ different winsorisa-
tion levels but this makes no difference to our
results. Winsorising at 1% results in an abnormal
change in total valuation of 5.25 (t = 0.80),
whilst winsorising at 5% results in a change of
3.97 (t = 0.76). Second, we use median figures
and a Wilcoxon test. The median abnormal change
in total valuations is 0.76 with a Z-value of 0.191.
Hence again, this finding is consistent with our key
finding of an insignificant impact.
A potential problem in comparing ex-post and
ex-ante valuations is that of share issues occuring
during the ex-post period (Ohlson, 2005). If share
prices after year 0 differ from average historical
issue prices, then the residual income model
incorporates a different capital charge without an
offseting different book value per share. A different
potential problem with a similar effect that may
have occurred with UK acquirers over our sample
period, is the revaluation of intangible assets to
replenish balance sheets depleted by goodwill
write-offs (Higson, 1998; O’Hanlon and Pope,
1999; Gregory, 2000). We check the robustness of
our findings to both problems by estimating book
value per share in each year subsequent to year 0 as
book value in year 0 plus cumulative EPS minus
cumulative dividends per share since year 0
(following Penman and Sougiannis, 1998). This
book value is unaffected by subsequent share issues
or revaluations after year 0. The abnormal change in
fundamental value using this method is an insig-
nificant 5.19% (t = 1.13). We are therefore
confident that our results are robust to these
potential biases.37
As with the profitability and share return tests, we
check our results for the subsample of acquisitions
with full data availability, uncontaminated by other
acquisitions. Again, our results are robust. The
abnormal fundamental value change for this sample
of 169 acquisitions is an insignificant 1.41% (t =
0.25) and thus similar to the full sample of a
statistically insignificant impact.
Finally, as with the profitability study, we carry
out robustness checks of the way in which our
fundamental approach incorporates goodwill. We
noted in Section 4 that the only issue that arises with
acquisition accounting is that the forecast horizon
should extend as far as the amortisation period, to
ensure that the predicted EPS used in the terminal
value is free of the amortisation charge.We have not
done this in our analysis both because it requires
knowledge of the length of the amortisation period
and because, for our sample, at most 34 acquirers
are potentially affected. The abnormal change in
fundamental value for the 269 acquirers that do not
potentially suffer this downward bias is an insig-
nificant 7.17 (t = 1.50). Therefore, there is no
evidence that our results are biased downwards by
this omission.
In this section we report on a wide range of
robustness tests and are confident that our main
conclusion, that acquisitions have a small and
insignificant effect on fundamental value, is robust.
This result stands in contrast to both the profitability
results, which are significantly positive, and the
share return effects, which are significantly nega-
tive. In seeking to reconcile the RIV results with the
profitability results, a key difference in the meth-
odologies is that the profitability approach measures
ROE, whereas the RIV approach measures post-
acquisition book value per share and EPS. Despite
the fact that ROE improves (as shown in Section
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37 Share issues and violations may distort pre-acquisition
ROE which we use to forecast post-acquisition EPS. To address
this concern, rather than using historical ROE to forecast future
EPS, we forecast post-acquisition year 0 EPS as year 1 EPS
multiplied by one plus the average percentage EPS growth over
the three pre-acquisition years. We then forecast year 1 EPS as
forecast year 0 EPSmultiplied by one plus the same EPS growth
rate, and so on for years 2 and 3. The abnormal change in
fundamental value using this method is0.75 (t-statistic –0.16)
and hence very similar to using historical ROE.
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5.1), we find (in additional tests) that acquirers’ EPS
decreases relative to control firms. The percentage
change in pre- and post-acquisition EPS for
acquiring firms relative to control firms is 9.00%
(t = 1.40). This appears to be an important reason
why the profitability results differ from the RIV
results. In trying to reconcile the RIV results with
the return results, we note above that one problem
with the share return methodology is that acquirers
may be overvalued at the time of acquisition, and
that the share price could fall following acquisition
because of this over-valuation regardless of the
impact on fundamental value. To consider this
further, we now examine the performance impacts
of a subset of acquisitions for which such over-
valuation appears likely.
5.3.2. The impact of acquirer overvaluation and
equity bids
Our RIV methodology incorporates the benefit
derived by acquirer shareholders from using over-
valued shares for the acquisition, and hence allows
us to examine whether cash bids and equity bids
have different impacts on fundamental value.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that this is an
important motivation for acquisitions and recent
evidence for both the US (Ang and Cheng, 2006
and Dong et al., 2006) and the UK (Bi and Gregory,
2008) suggests that acquirers using equity are
overvalued at the time of acquisition.
To examine whether there is any evidence of
acquirer overvaluation in our sample, we divide the
fundamental pre-takeover valuation by the share
price at announcement for both acquirers and
control firms. The value for acquirers is 0.95, whilst
for control firms it is 0.97 and the difference is not
significant. Since any equity overvaluation effect is
presumably limited to cases where the firm issues
equity, we restrict the same analysis to ‘equity’ bids,
as defined in Table 1. In this case the value for
acquirers is 0.90 whilst that for control firms is 0.97.
The difference is insignificant using a parametric
test (t = 1.50), but is significant using a Wilcoxon
Test (z =2.23). Hence we find some evidence that
acquirers using equity are overvalued.38
Next, we examine whether the impact on funda-
mental value differs by method of payment and
overvaluation. The impact of cash acquisitions (65)
on fundamental value is insignificantly positive
(11.01%), whilst the impact of equity acquisitions
(173) is insignificantly negative (2.40%). The
difference in the abnormal returns between the two
types of acquisition is insignificant.39 We further
examine the impact on the subsample of equity
bidders that are overvalued prior to acquisition
(101) relative to control firms. In this case the
impact on fundamental value is a significant 39.50
(t = 5.37). Therefore, we find strong evidence that
acquirers that are overvalued and use equity to pay
for the acquisition create significant fundamental
value for their shareholders. In stark contrast, the
share returns for this subsample of 101 firms is
worse than for the sample as a whole, with
announcement returns of 2.52% and long-run
buy-and-hold returns of 28.02%. Therefore, the
equity overvaluation effect may go some way to
explaining the negative impact of takeover on share
returns and the difference between the impact of
acquisitions on share returns and on fundamental
value.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we develop a methodology for
evaluating takeover success by measuring whether
the fundamental value of acquirers is greater after an
acquisition. Our methodology employs the residual
income approach to fundamental valuation, and
differs significantly from profitability and share
return studies. Profitability studies do not quantify
the total discounted value effect of takeovers
because they do not account for the cost of capital,
the timing of profits earned, or the amount paid for
the target company. Share return studies on the other
hand, reflect many factors, such as anticipation of
the acquisition or initial market mispricing at
announcement, and not necessarily the fundamental
impact of acquisitions. The fundamental value
approach that we develop quantifies the total
discounted value effect of takeovers and is less
reliant upon stock market prices. As such, it has
advantages over both the profitability and share
return approaches in measuring the impact of
acquisition on fundamental value. However, our
approach shares some of the same weaknesses and
requires a number of important assumptions.
We test all three methodologies on a comprehen-
sive sample of 303 takeovers involving UK public
companies. These takeovers result in a significant
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38 Previous studies for the US (Ang and Cheng, 2005; Dong
et al., 2006) and the UK (Bi and Gregory, 2008), find stronger
evidence of acquirer overvaluation. However, the difference
appears to be driven by the difference in sample time periods.
For example, Dong et al. (2006) report an average V/P (RIV
value/share price) of 0.77 over 1978–2000. However, the
average V/P of Dong et al. over our sample time period (1985–
1996) (estimated from their Table 2) is much higher at 0.89 and
very close to our value of 0.95.
39 The impact of mixed (equity plus cash) acquisitions on
fundamental value is 17.15 (t = 1.43) whilst the impact of
other payment methods on fundamental value is 38.91 (t =
2.48).
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improvement in the profitability of the merging
companies. However, acquirer share returns over
both the announcement and long-run post-takeover
periods are significantly negative. Both sets of
findings are consistent with other UK studies for our
sample time period. Using our fundamental valu-
ation approach, we find that acquisitions have a
small and insignificant effect on fundamental value,
relative to control firms. Therefore, the results found
using a fundamental value approach differ signifi-
cantly from the profitability and share return
approaches.
Our fundamental value results are subject to a
number of qualifications and potential weaknesses
as pointed out above. However, if we nevertheless
accept them as accurately estimating an insignifi-
cant effect on fundamental value, then what do the
results imply about the proper interpretation of the
profitability and return studies?
First, with regard to profitability, although this
improves for the combined assets post-acquisition,
a combination of factors would appear to result in
this improvement not being reflected in an increase
in fundamental value; although return on equity
increases after acquisition, EPS does not; the
improved profitability declines over the post-acqui-
sition period, resulting in a relatively low terminal
value; acquirer leverage increases following acqui-
sition causing an increase in the cost of equity,
hence reducing the present value of the increased
profits; and the cost of the acquisition is fully
incorporated, unlike with the profitability measure
due to acquirers writing off goodwill over our
sample period.
Second, with regard to the return studies, our
findings clearly refute the argument that the nega-
tive share returns experienced by acquirer firms
reflect the stock market belatedly reacting to the
impact of acquisitions on acquirers’ fundamental
values. Furthermore, we find that acquirers are
somewhat overvalued by the stock market at
announcement, and that share returns are even
more negative for overvalued acquirers, despite the
fact that these acquirers experience a significant
increase in fundamental value. Therefore, the equity
overvaluation effect may go some way to explain-
ing the negative impact of takeover on share returns
and the difference between the impact of acquisi-
tions on share returns and on fundamental value.
Overall, we conclude that it is potentially
misleading to draw conclusions on the fundamental
value impact of takeover from either profitability or
share return studies. However, empirical application
of the residual income model employed here
requires a number of important assumptions. We
have carried out a number of additional tests to
check the robustness of our key findings. However,
further research could examine whether our meth-
odology stands the test of further exploration of this
or more recent data. One worthwhile approach
would be to use analyst forecasts (rather than
historical earnings) to predict future (post-acquisi-
tion) EPS, which would avoid any problems of dirty
surplus accounting in the pre-acquisition period.
Additionally, future research could extend the
analysis to a more recent sample of acquisitions,
to ensure that our results are robust across different
time periods.
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